If Morales Wins, Will He Seek the Presidency?
Rule #1: Winning the Popular Vote is Not Winning the Presidency
Okay, let’s say that the polls are relatively accurate and not much changes between now and December 18th. If that is the case, then Evo Morales and MAS will likely finish in first place with (and this is a guess) somewhere between 30% to 35% of the vote. Tuto Quiroga comes in a strong second place with 25%. Samuel Doria Medina finishes third with 15% or so. The rest of the pack comes in with somewhere between 2% to 5% each.
To be sure, other scenarios are possible. Morales could ride a late surge and come close to 40% (MAS greatest hope is another lame statement against him out of the US Embassy like in 2002, but the Embassy is not that lame). Tuto could also find a last minute surge of Medina voters rushing to his side in an anti-Evo vote, a move Quiroga is trying to promote with public statements that, if he were running in third place he would drop out and back whomever could beat Morales.
I now present rule #1 for novice reporters of Bolivian politics: Coming in first in the popular vote does not mean you win the Presidency.
Once the vote is counted the real game begins, the behind-closed-doors negotiations between the parties in which the two top place finishers (under the Constitution, only they can be elected to the Presidency) try to assemble a block of 51% of the Congress. That vote in the Congress is how Bolivia elects its President, not the popular vote on December 18th.
If Quiroga should finish in first place, it seems a pretty clear scenario that Medina will join with him to get his 51% and deliver the former President a Presidency to call his own (Quiroga’s previous year as President was to serve out the term of the dying Hugo Banzer).
If Morales and Quiroga finish first and second respectively, Mr. Medina becomes the only Bolivian voter that matters, and he has certainly been sending out ample signals that an alliance with MAS is possible. This includes some sharpened rhetoric against foreign corporations, from the man who joined Bechtel as a 5% investor in the debacle of Bechtel’s water takeover in Cochabamba five years ago.
Evo’s Choice
Certainly there is ample speculation that MAS and Morales would eagerly join with Medina to give Bolivia its first indigenous President and one clearly dedicated to reversing the nation’s “Washington Consensus’ economic course. Such a deal would win Morales his long sought Presidency (this is his third run) and would probably deliver Medina and his backers an ample share of political power, especially in the government’s economic apparatus.
But there is also a very good chance that Morales and MAS might not contest the Presidency at all, and that comes from a source of mine that is about as close as one gets to Morales. Here’s why:
First, any deal with Medina would compromise a Morales/MAS government deeply from the start, and in particular on the two issues at the heart of the MAS campaign. A coalition that includes a leader in the Santa Cruz autonomy movement (Medina’s Vice-Presidential running mate) does not bode well for a forceful move forward to convene a Constituent Assembly. A coalition with deep connections to international corporations does not pave a smooth road to take back Bolivia’s gas and oil from those corporations.
Second, Morales would face a Congress that is assuredly going to be dedicated to blocking him at every turn. His base in Congress would be a clear minority and a good portion of the rest would love to see a Morales Presidency fall flat on its face.
Third, from the moment he assumes the Presidency Morales would face a mountain of high (an unrealistic) expectations from his supporters and from Bolivia’s social movements – an absolute guarantee of disappointment. And in Bolivia popular disappointment with politicians is not a pretty sight – hence its current average of a new President each year.
Evo’s Alternative
The alternative is for MAS to not seek the Presidency by wheeling and dealing for a 51% majority. Instead MAS could stand aside and let a very weak Tuto Quiroga take the Presidency and immediately turn its first place finish into political and street pressure for the convening of a Constituent Assembly. That Assembly would be empowered to both rewrite the political structure of the government and deal with issues such as taking back the nation’s gas and oil from the likes of British Gas, Shell, Enron and Repsol. Being a strong opposition instead of a weak government has its advantages, both for the issues MAS is promoting and its longer-term prospects for a successful Presidency instead of a failed one.
This is clearly the debate within MAS in the run up to the December 18 vote and will continue to be afterwards if Morales finishes first. Standing in the way of such a strategy is the nation’s most powerful ideology – not socialism, not capitalism, but opportunism. Political campaigns are fueled by a sense of self-destiny. Candidates couldn’t do all they do without it. If Morales and MAS finish with close to 40% of the vote or higher, a real chance to take the Presidency will be a hard thing to walk away from, especially for all those people who can get jobs out if it.
So my friends in the press, welcome to the complicated chess game that is Bolivian politics. And oh yes, if you come to Cochabamba, be sure to try the Pique Macho.

The Democracy Center, based in Cochabamba Bolivia and San Francisco California, works globally to advance human rights through a combination of investigation and reporting, training citizens in the art of public advocacy, and organizing international citizen campaigns. If you like the Blog, consider becoming a subscriber to The Democracy Center's free e-newsletter by sending us an email at 